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Abstract 
Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are 
insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. 
This asymmetric stock market reaction suggests either that bond downgrades are timelier than 
upgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades but not downgrades. This 
study investigates these conjectures by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy 
(assessed using bankruptcy prediction models) and voluntary disclosure activity around rating 
change announcements. The results indicate that the assessed probability of bankruptcy 
decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the assessed probability of 
bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. We also find that controlling for 
potential wealth-transfer related rating actions, which can impact stock returns differently, does 
not alter our results.  Tests of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by firms suggest that 
the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-
rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The results support the 
hypothesis that downgrades are timelier than upgrades. 
 
 
JEL classification: G30; G33; M41 
 
Keywords: Bond rating; Bankruptcy probability; Default risk; Voluntary disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Sanjiv Das, Michael Eames, Joseph Piotroski, 
Patricia O’Brien, and workshop participants at the 2004 American Accounting Association 
annual meeting for their comments and suggestions. Kim acknowledges financial support 
provided by the Accounting Development Fund at Santa Clara University. 
  
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 408 554 4667; fax: +1 408 554 5193. 
   E-mail address: y1kim@scu.edu (Y. Kim). 
 1
Bankruptcy Probability Changes and the Differential Informativeness of 
Bond Upgrades and Downgrades 
 
1. Introduction 
 Prior studies (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich, 
1992; and Goh and Ederingtion, 1993) have found that the stock market responds negatively to 
announcements of downgrades of firms’ bond ratings. However, these studies have found no 
stock price response to announcements of bond rating upgrades. This evidence suggests that 
bond downgrades are useful to investors, but bond upgrades have no information content. 
 Why does the stock market respond differently to bond upgrades and downgrades?  
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) offer two potential explanations. First, rating agencies may have 
asymmetric loss functions, and hence upgrades are not as timely as downgrades. That is, 
upgrades merely reflect publicly available (favorable) data, whereas downgrades preempt any 
public release of unfavorable data. Second, firms may be more likely to voluntarily communicate 
good news to the market than bad news. Hence, the rating agencies’ actions may be more 
informative in the case of downgrades than upgrades. 
 In this study, we investigate these reasons for the differential stock market response to 
bond upgrades and downgrades. We test for the differential timeliness of bond upgrades and 
downgrades by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy around revisions of their 
bond ratings. Bond ratings are intended to capture default risk, and the probability of bankruptcy 
is a credible proxy for this risk. Following recent improvements in bankruptcy prediction 
methodology (e.g., Shumway, 2001), we present an analysis of pre- and post-rating revision 
bankruptcy probability changes, as assessed by a model developed by Chava and Jarrow (2004). 
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The results of this analysis, however, are not qualitatively altered if we use one of the other 
bankruptcy models. We test for differences in the pre-rating change voluntary disclosure activity 
of upgraded and downgraded firms by comparing the frequency and change in frequency of 
issuance of press releases and management earnings forecasts by these firms.   
 The results from the investigation of bankruptcy risk changes indicate that for firms whose 
bonds are upgraded, there is a significant median reduction in the assessed probability of 
bankruptcy prior to the rating change. For these firms, there is no change in the assessed 
probability of bankruptcy after the rating change. However, for firms whose bonds are downgraded, 
we find significant increases in the assessed probability of bankruptcy both prior to and following 
the rating change.1  
Our analysis of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by upgraded and downgraded 
firms suggests that the differential informativeness of bond upgrades and downgrades is not 
caused by differences in the pre-rating change voluntary disclosure activity of these firms. The 
results are consistent with Holthausen and Leftwich’s (1986) conjecture that downgrades are 
timelier than upgrades, and suggest that the rating agencies expend more resources in detecting 
deterioration in firms’ financial prospects than in identifying improvements. 
 Our results are likely to be helpful to regulators such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) who recently examine the bond rating agencies’ role in the capital markets. 
The rating agencies have recently come under intense public and regulator scrutiny following the 
credit default by Enron Corp. Such scrutiny has also occurred in the past after other high-profile 
financial crises such as those at New York City (in the 1970s), Orange County, and the 
                                                          
1 The stock (and debt) price reaction to rating changes may also be influenced by potential wealth transfers 
between bondholders and equityholders (e.g., Zaima and McCarthy, 1988; Kliger and Sarig, 2000). With such 
transfers, a decline (increase) in equity value is possible in response to improvement (deterioration) in debt ratings. 
Our analysis suggests that wealth-transfer related rating revisions do not impact our results. 
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Washington Public Power System (SEC, 2003a). Critics of the rating agencies allege that the 
agencies do not provide timely information about the creditworthiness of companies (SEC, 
2003a, page 16), that the agencies move too slowly to be useful to investors, and that they wait 
too long to downgrade (Zuckerman and Sapsford, 2001; White, 2002). Following congressional 
hearings on the role of the rating agencies in the Enron collapse (Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 3/20/2002), and as directed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC 
has launched a review of the level of oversight that should apply to the rating agencies (SEC, 
2003b). Our results, while consistent with some of the critics’ concerns (we find that neither 
upgrades nor downgrades are entirely timely), also indicate that downgrades are useful indicators 
of subsequent deterioration in firms’ prospects. 
 Our study is also related to prior research by Ederington and Goh (1998), who find that 
stock analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to both upgrades and downgrades, and 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001), who find that downgraded firms experience negative stock returns 
for up to a year following the rating revisions. These studies also find that firm profitability 
declines subsequent to a downgrade. Our study makes the following contributions to this line of 
research. First, unlike prior studies that examine the financial analysts’ forecasts or behavior of 
long-term stock returns, we focus on changes in the probability of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy risk is 
a variable of interest to a broad range of stakeholders – not only investors, but also lenders, 
creditors, and implicit claimants.2 Second, the prior studies do not directly address how well (or 
poorly) the rating agencies perform their role in the capital markets. An examination of 
bankruptcy probability changes around ratings revisions allows such an assessment, because 
bond ratings are intended to convey default risk information. The performance of the rating 
                                                          
2 Holthausen and Watts (2001), among others, suggest that stock returns may not always capture an event’s 
relevance to lenders and creditors. 
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agencies is a subject of recent regulatory interest, as discussed above. Finally, no prior study has 
investigated Holthausen and Leftwich’s (1986) second hypothesis that the differential 
informativeness of upgrades and downgrades may be attributable to differences in the pre-rating 
change voluntary disclosure activity of upgraded and downgraded firms. We conduct such an 
investigation. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of 
the sample, and the results of an event study around rating changes. Section 3 discusses the 
bankruptcy prediction models and presents the empirical tests of changes in firms’ probabilities 
of bankruptcy around revisions of their bond ratings. Section 4 examines differences in the pre-
rating change disclosure behavior of upgraded and downgraded firms. Section 5 presents 
additional results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Sample Selection 
2.1. Sample Selection 
 For this study, we obtain bond rating changes from Moody’s Default Risk Service database 
for the years 1980 through 2003, retaining only the most senior issues for multiple concurrent rating 
changes pertaining to covered firms. The Moody’s database yields 6,697 such rating changes, but 
matching these data with CRSP and Compustat reduces the initial sample size to 2,476. We exclude 
financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999), comprising a total of 514 observations, for consistency 
with prior research and because the information environment for these firms is unique. We also 
exclude 535 observations, because we cannot determine fiscal year-ends for these firms. We require 
fiscal year-ends to align quarterly financial data with the rating change dates. To control for the 
impact of multiple rating changes issued successively, we retain only rating changes that are not 
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followed by a subsequent rating change within one-year period. This procedure eliminates 344 
observations. Finally we exclude 335 observations because complete data are not available to 
compute bankruptcy probabilities. Our test sample thus contains 748 rating changes. 
 
2.2. Description of Sample and Rating Changes 
 Table 1 describes the sample, which contains 238 upgrades and 510 downgrades. In 
Panel A, we report sample firm characteristics. The statistics in the panel indicate that upgraded 
firms are larger, more profitable, and have relatively less debt than are downgraded firms. Panel 
B presents the distribution of the sample over time, as well as the relative proportions of 
upgrades and downgrades during each year. Both the number of rating changes and the 
proportion of downgrades are high in the later years. Panel C reports the industry membership of 
the sample observations based on the Chava and Jarrow (2004) classification scheme. 
Transportation, communications and utilities firms comprise over half the sample, followed by 
manufacturing and minerals firms, which are about one-fourth of the sample. 
Table 2 presents information on the types of rating changes in the sample.3  Ratings of 
Baa3 or better are considered investment grade, and a majority of the rating changes in the sample 
are within investment grade or within speculative grade rating categories. Of the 238 upgrades, 106 
are within investment grade rating categories, 92 are within speculative grade rating categories, 
while 40 are from speculative grade to investment grade. Of the 510 downgrades, 183 are within 
investment grade rating categories, 289 are within speculative grade rating categories, while 38 are 
from investment grade to speculative grade. Table 2 also indicates the number of grades by which 
                                                          
3 Moody’s did not assign class modifiers (1, 2, or 3) to its ratings prior to April 20, 1982. For these observations 
(6 upgrades and 10 downgrades), we code a modifier of 2.  
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ratings are changed. The sample consists predominantly of one-grade (154 upgrades and 245 
downgrades) and two-grade (53 upgrades and 165 downgrades) changes. 
 
2.3. Stock Price Reaction to Rating Changes 
 We first examine abnormal stock returns around the rating changes, to verify conformity 
with the stock price behavior documented in prior studies. For each sample observation, we 
compute market model prediction errors over a three-day event window (day –1 through day +1). 
Following prior research (Holthausen and Leftwich 1986), firm-specific market models are 
estimated by regressing daily stock returns on the CRSP equally-weighted index over a post-
rating change estimation period (day +61 through day +315). 
 Returns data are available on CRSP for 203 upgrade observations and 427 downgrade 
observations. Consistent with prior studies, we find no evidence of a stock price reaction to bond 
upgrades. The mean three-day abnormal return around the upgrades is 0.06 percent (statistically 
insignificant), whereas the median three-day abnormal return is -0.19 percent (statistically 
insignificant). By contrast, the average stock price response to bond downgrades is significantly 
negative. The mean three-day abnormal return is –2.68 percent (p-value < 0.0001), and the 
median three-day abnormal return is –1.27 percent (p-value < 0.0001). 
 
3. Bond Rating Revisions and Changes in the Probability of Bankruptcy 
3.1. Bankruptcy Prediction Model 
 This study investigates changes in the probability of bankruptcy around bond rating 
changes. In order to measure the probability of bankruptcy, researchers have historically used 
Altman’s (1968) multiple discriminant analysis model or Ohlson’s (1980) conditional logit model. 
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In a recent study, Shumway (2001) argues that the extant models produce biased and inconsistent 
bankruptcy probabilities. He proposes a hazard model that uses both accounting and market 
information and yields better out-of-sample prediction results than the traditional models. Chava 
and Jarrow (2004) extend and validate Shumway’s research, and also develop a model that uses 
monthly data and that incorporates industry effects. Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) results indicate that 
the monthly data-based model outperforms the annual models in predicting bankruptcy. Chava and 
Jarrow’s estimation period is 1962-1999, which, unlike previous studies, covers a substantial 
portion of our sample period (1980-2003). Moreover a monthly data-based model allows us to 
investigate the informativeness of bond rating revisions over finer time intervals than the annual 
models. Accordingly, we use the Chava and Jarrow (2004, page 564) monthly model in our 
analysis. We choose to use their public firm model that utilizes both financial data and market-
driven variables. However, we obtain similar results when we use Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) 
private firm model that utilizes only financial data, or other models such as quarterly versions of 
the Shumway model or the modified Ohlson model estimated by Hillegeist et al. (2004). 
The Chava and Jarrow model for public firms is: 
 
B_Prob = exp(βX)/(1+ exp(βX))              (1)  
βX = -14.8859 – 1.9236*NITA + 4.0338*TLTA – 0.4597*IND2 – 0.0178*IND3 
 – 1.2260*IND4 + 0.3414*NITA*IND2 – 2.5921*NITA*IND3  
– 3.4877*NITA*IND4 + 0.3547*TLTA*IND2 – 0.3423*TLTA*IND3 
+ 0.2175*TLTA*IND4 – 2.26620*EXRET – 0.3475*RSIZ + 0.8312*SIGMA     (2) 
 
where: B_Prob is the estimated bankruptcy probability; NITA equals net income divided by total 
assets; TLTA equals total liabilities divided by total assets; IND2 equals one for the 
manufacturing and minerals industries, else 0; IND3 equals one for the transportation, 
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communications and utilities industries, else 0; IND4 equals one for financials and insurance 
firms, else 0; EXRET equals cumulative monthly returns over twelve months for the firm less 
cumulative monthly returns for the CRSP value-weighted index; RSIZ equals log of (market 
capitalization of firm divided by total CRSP market capitalization); SIGMA equals the standard 
deviation of the residuals from a twelve-month regression of the firm’s stock returns on CRSP 
value-weighted index returns.  
In equation (2), both the accounting and market data are lagged by a month so that they are 
available to the market at the time of the estimate, consistent with Chava and Jarrow (2004). The 
accounting data are lagged to ensure that quarterly accounting reports’ release occurs prior to the 
month for which bankruptcy probability is estimated. As discussed previously, we exclude financial 
and insurance firms from our sample. Accordingly, IND4 is coded 0 for all our observations. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on post-rating change B_Probs for our sample. In 
Panel A, we report the distribution of B_Probs separately for investment grade (Baa3 and better) 
and speculative grade (Ba1 and worse) firms. For investment grade firms, the mean B_Prob 
following the rating change is 0.0002, and the median probability is 0.0001. The corresponding 
summary measures for speculative grade firms are higher. The mean B_Prob for speculative firms 
is 0.0491, whereas the median probability is 0.0009. These statistics suggest that relatively high 
bond ratings are associated with relatively low probabilities of bankruptcy, as would be expected. 
 This inverse relationship between bond rating and probability of bankruptcy is further 
highlighted in Panel B of the table. In the panel, we examine correlations between revised ratings 
and B_Probs following the rating change. The ratings are measured from 1 for C to 21 for Aaa. 
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We examine both Pearson and Spearman correlations for the full sample, and also separately for 
upgrades and downgrades. All correlations in the panel are significantly negative, indicating that 
the revised ratings and post-rating revision B_Probs are associated negatively. 
 
3.3. Changes in the Probabilities of Bankruptcy around the Rating Changes 
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis of changes in the estimated probability of 
bankruptcy for upgrades and downgrades. We report mean and median monthly changes in B_Probs 
for a seven month test window around the rating revision (month-3 through month+3). Bond upgrades 
imply a reduced risk of financial distress and hence we expect upgrades to be associated with B_Prob 
decreases. Similarly, we expect downgrades to be associated with B_Prob increases.  
Table 4, Panel A presents results for our full sample consisting of 238 upgrades and 510 
downgrades. These results show median decreases in B_Probs in the three months preceding the 
rating changes for firms whose bonds are upgraded. The B_Prob change is significantly negative 
in month-3. However, the mean and median B_Prob changes are not statistically significant in the 
month of and after the upgrade. By contrast, for firms whose bonds are downgraded, B_Probs 
increase significantly both prior to, and following, the rating revision. In the month immediately 
preceding the downgrade, the mean B_Prob change is 0.009 (p-value < 0.001). Similarly the 
mean B_Prob change is 0.0114 (p-value < 0.01) during the downgrade month and 0.0086 (p-
value < 0.01) in the following month. 
Debt rating changes may occasionally be indicative of wealth transfers between 
bondholders and equityholders (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Zaima and McCarthy, 
1988; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Kliger and Sarig, 2000). Such transfers could arise from past 
or anticipated changes in cash flow variability or leverage. Although factors related to both 
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variability and leverage are inputs in the bankruptcy prediction model, we assess the impact of 
wealth transfer-related ratings revisions on our results as follows. Since downgrades (upgrades) 
prompted by wealth transfers may favorably (unfavorably) affect equity values, we investigate a 
sub-sample of firms for which the direction of the rating revision is the same as the direction of 
the stock price reaction to the revision. This sub-sample presumably excludes the most 
significant wealth transfer-related rating actions, and is restricted to 101 “good news” upgrades 
(positive abnormal stock returns in the three-day event window around the rating agency’s 
announcement) and 354 “bad news” downgrades (negative abnormal returns). The results for this 
sub-sample reported in Panel B of Table 4 are consistent with those for the full sample. For 
upgrades, the probability of bankruptcy decreases before the rating revision. However 
downgrades are both preceded and followed by significant increases in the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that neither upgrades nor downgrades are entirely timely, 
because significant shifts in bankruptcy risk occur prior to both types of rating changes. Unlike 
upgrades, however, downgrades anticipate subsequent changes in bankruptcy risk. Following a 
downgrade, the average firm experiences a significant increase in bankruptcy risk following the 
announcement of the rating change.4 The results are thus consistent with the hypothesis that 
downgrades are timelier and more informative than upgrades. 
The results are robust with respect to the choice of models. We replicate our tests with 
Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) private firm model, a quarterly version of the Shumway model, and a 
quarterly version of Hillegeist et al.’s (2004, table 2) updated Ohlson model (results not tabulated 
here). For upgrades, we find that the probability of bankruptcy decreases in the months preceding 
                                                          
4 Mean and median probability changes in months beyond +3 are statistically insignificant.  
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the rating change, but not after the upgrade announcement. By contrast, we find significant 
increases in the bankruptcy risk of downgraded firms both prior to and following the rating 
change. These results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 4, and the inferences 
remain the same. 
 
3.4. The Association Between Stock Returns and Bankruptcy Probability Changes 
The preceding analysis indicates that upgrades are merely reflective of market’s perception of 
previous bankruptcy probability changes, whereas downgrades are indicative of future deterioration 
in firms’ financial prospects. This suggests that the differential stock price reaction to bond upgrades 
and downgrades is caused by the differential timeliness of upgrades and downgrades. We use 
regression analysis to examine the relationship between the stock price response to the rating change 
and bankruptcy probability changes in the months surrounding the rating change: 
 
CAR = a0 + a1Number of Grades + a2B_Prob Change in Month-3  
+ a3B_Prob Change in Month-2 + a4B_Prob Change in Month-1 
+ a5B_Prob Change in Month0 + a6B_Prob Change in Month+1 
+ a7B_Prob Change in Month+2 + a8B_Prob Change in Month+3 + e        (3)  
 
where: CAR equals the three-day (day –1 through day +1) cumulative market model prediction 
error, Number of Grades equals the number of grades that the rating is revised, computed as the 
new rating minus the old rating where ratings are measured from 1 for C to 21 for Aaa, and 
B_Prob Change in Montht is computed as the montht-end B_Prob minus the montht-1-end B_Prob.5 
                                                          
5 For example, when a rating is updated from Baa1 to A2, Number of Grades is 2. Similarly, when a rating is 
revised from A1 to Baa1, Number of Grades is -3. 
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 Since an increase in the B_Prob indicates deterioration in the firm’s financial position 
(bad news), we expect a negative relationship between CAR and the B_Prob changes. We include 
Number of Grades as a control variable in the regression, because the magnitude of the rating 
change may affect the magnitude of the stock price response. Before discussing the estimation 
results, we note that the regression is a joint test of (a) the bankruptcy probability model adopted 
here, and, (b) the relationship between stock returns and bankruptcy probability changes. 
Table 5 reports estimation results for equation (3) for the full sample, as well as for the 
downgrade sub-sample. The results for the full sample indicate that CAR is negatively associated 
with both lagged and future B_Prob changes. The significant coefficients on the lagged B_Prob 
change variables suggest that investors delay part of their response to the firm’s bankruptcy risk 
change in the previous months until the firm’s debt rating is revised. This delayed reaction may 
be attributable to costs imposed by implicit stakeholders, who use bond rating actions, rather 
than other indicators of bankruptcy risk to revise the prices of their claims (Cornell, Landsman, 
and Shapiro, 1989). 
In Table 5, the results for the downgrade sub-sample indicate that CAR is significantly 
associated with bankruptcy probability changes in months +1 and +2. This suggests that 
investors view a downgrade to be informative about the forthcoming deterioration in the firm’s 
financial condition.6  Number of Grades has a positive coefficient, indicating that the sharper the 
downgrade, the more adverse the stock price reaction. We also estimate the regression with an 
additional control for rating changes across rating grade categories (investment to speculative or 
speculative to investment), but this variable is statistically insignificant (consistent with 
                                                          
6 Estimation results for alternate specifications (log-transformed variables; rank regressions) are similar to those 
reported in Table 5. 
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Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986), and the significance levels for the other variables are similar to 
those reported here. 
 For completeness, we also estimate equation (3) for a sub-sample of upgrades, although 
these estimation results are not tabulated given the statistically insignificant average stock price 
reaction to upgrade announcements. Our untabulated results for upgrades are markedly different 
from those reported above for downgrades. The CAR for upgrades is significantly associated 
only with B_Prob changes in months -3 and -2, implying delayed market reaction to a decrease 
in bankruptcy risk, but not with any of the post-rating revision B_Prob changes. 
One limitation of the analysis in Table 5 is that CAR and the estimated bankruptcy 
probabilities are both computed from stock returns data. However this limitation applies to both the 
upgrade and the downgrade sub-samples, which nevertheless yield substantially different results. 
Moreover we obtain qualitatively similar results (not tabulated) when we use prediction models that 
are based purely on financial statement data (e.g., Chava and Jarrow’s (2004) private firm model).  
 Our results, which support the usefulness of bond downgrades, are not necessarily 
inconsistent with Dichev and Piotroski’s (2001) evidence that the stock returns of downgraded firms 
continue to be negative for a year following the downgrade announcement. Our regression results 
suggest that investors view downgrades to be informative signals about bankruptcy probability 
increases in subsequent months, since the magnitude of the announcement stock returns is a function 
of these future bankruptcy probability changes. We do not presume our results in Table 5 to imply 
that the stock market reaction to the signal in the downgrades is complete. Indeed our results in the 
previous section indicate that downgrades are not perfectly timely, and this constrains their 
usefulness as well.     
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Stock prices react to bond downgrades, 
but not to bond upgrades. Upgrades and downgrades differ in timeliness, since deterioration in 
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firms’ bankruptcy probability is evident subsequent to downgrades, but no such post-rating 
revision shift in bankruptcy risk is evident for upgrades. Moreover the stock price response to the 
rating revision is associated with subsequent changes in bankruptcy risk for downgrades, but not 
for upgrades. This suggests that that the differential stock price reaction to upgrades and 
downgrades is likely reflective of the differential timeliness of these two types of rating changes. 
The evidence overall is consistent with the hypothesis that the rating agencies have asymmetric 
loss functions (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; as a result of which they expend more resources 
in detecting deterioration in firms’ financial prospects than in detecting improvements, 
Ederington and Goh, 1998). The results do indicate that downgrades are not entirely timely, 
since firms’ bankruptcy risk also increases prior to the rating revisions. 
 
4. Voluntary Disclosure by Upgraded and Downgraded Firms 
 The preceding analysis suggests that stock prices react to downgrades but not to upgrades 
because upgrades are associated only with past changes in default risk, whereas downgrades 
reflect some default risk changes in the periods subsequent to the rating change. In this section, 
we investigate an alternative explanation for the differential informativeness of upgrades and 
downgrades: Voluntary disclosures by managers may preempt upgrades but not downgrades 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986). 
We evaluate this conjecture by examining differences in pre-rating revision voluntary 
disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. We perform these tests on two proxies for 
voluntary disclosure. Following Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994), our first proxy for 
voluntary disclosure is the number of press releases issued by sample firms. Since press releases 
may occasionally communicate non-financial information, our second proxy is one that focuses 
exclusively on financial data, the number of management earnings forecasts issued by sample 
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firms.7  The sample period for this analysis is 1991-2003, since data coverage on our databases is 
sparse prior to that time. These observations comprise approximately two-thirds of our full 
sample, as well as of both the upgrade and downgrade sub-samples. 
For each disclosure variable, we examine the number of disclosures in the three-month 
period just prior to the rating change, as well as the change and the percentage change relative to 
the preceding three-month period. The number of press releases for each sample firm is 
identified through a search by company name on Business Wire and PR Newswire. Following 
Bamber and Cheon (1998), management earnings forecasts (point and range) are identified 
through a search by company name of the following two keyword sets on Business Wire, PR 
Newswire, and Dow Jones News Service: (1) see(s), expect(s), forecast(s), project(s), 
estimate(s), higher, and lower; and (2) earnings, income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), 
improvement, better, and performance. 
Table 6 reports the means and medians of the disclosure proxies for the upgrade and 
downgrade sub-samples, along with significance levels for tests of differences between means (t-
test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) for the two sub-samples. In Panel A, we present our analysis 
of press releases, whereas the results for management earnings forecasts are reported in Panel B. 
There is no evidence that upgraded firms voluntarily disclose more prior to the rating 
action than downgraded firms. In Panel A, the mean (median) number of press releases issued in 
the three-month period prior to the rating change is 11.24(4) for the upgrade sub-sample and 
11.46 (2) for the downgrade sub-sample.8  The differences in these averages are not statistically 
                                                          
7 We do not categorize press releases as financial and non-financial, because investors may often use seemingly 
non-financial disclosures to predict future financial performance. For example, a disclosure about a new product 
launch could be used to predict future sales or promotion expenses. 
 
8 By comparison, Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) report annual means (medians) of 25 (18) releases for 
their at-risk sample and 93 (63) for their shareholder litigations sample (1987-1991). 
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significant. The means and medians for the change and percentage change variables indicate a 
slight increase (relative to the preceding three months) in the number of press releases issued for 
both the average upgraded and downgraded firms.9  Again, none of the means or medians 
statistically differ between the upgrade and downgrade sub-samples. 
In Panel B, the mean number of forecasts issued is 0.108 for upgraded firms and 0.221 
for downgraded firms.10  This difference is significant at the 0.01 level, and is consistent with the 
high level of disclosure by bad news firms documented in Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) 
and Skinner (1994). This result, however, runs contrary to the hypothesis that upgraded firms 
disclose more than downgraded firms. The results for the change and percentage change in the 
number of forecasts also indicate a higher level of disclosure activity by downgraded firms 
relative to upgraded firms, but the means and medians of these variables are not significantly 
different between the two sub-samples. 
One limitation of the analysis in Table 6 is that it ignores the content of the disclosures. The 
nature of the content (good or bad) of the press releases cannot be accurately assessed without a 
model of market expectations for the data in the disclosures. We do, however, attempt to assess 
the content of the management earnings forecasts. For each forecast, we compare the manager’s 
earnings prediction to the existing consensus analyst forecast obtained from IBES. Management 
forecasts that exceed the existing analyst consensus are coded as good news, while those that fall 
short of the consensus are coded as bad news. Table 7 indicates that the mean number of bad 
news forecasts issued by downgraded firms (0.065) exceeds the mean number of good news 
                                                          
9 The sample sizes are relatively small for the percentage change variables in the two panels, because we 
exclude observations with zero disclosures in the denominator. 
 
10 Skinner (1994) reports an average earnings forecast number of “less than one per firm per year” (1981-1990) 
whereas Kasznik and Lev (1995) report mean earnings or sales forecasts of 0.094 by good news firms and 0.211 by 
bad news firms during a 60-day pre-earnings announcement period (1988-1990).  
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forecasts issued by upgraded firms (0.019). The results of the management forecast content 
analysis are thus supportive of the evidence in Table 6. 
As an additional check, we include the disclosure variables (both separately and together) in 
the stock returns regression (equation (3)), but none of the coefficients on these variables come out 
significant (p-values range from 0.41 to 0.97), and the other estimation results (not tabulated here) 
are similar to those reported in Table 5. These results, together with those reported in Tables 6 and 
7, suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not attributable to 
pre-rating change differences in voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. 
 
5. Additional Analysis on the Informativeness of Rating Changes during 1998-2001 
We lastly investigate the informativeness of bond rating changes during the sub-period 
1998-2001. The sample periods of bond ratings studies published recently (e.g., Dichev and 
Piotroski, 2001) run through the mid-nineties, and more current evidence is relatively sparse. 
Second, the SEC’s (2003c) study of violations of securities laws by accountants and investment 
professionals, commissioned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, covers the period 1998-2001, 
consistent with the belief that the performance of financial intermediaries was somewhat lax 
during the period. Moreover Enron’s financial crisis, which focused the public’s attention on the 
rating agencies, occurred in November 2001. 
    The sub-period sample consists of 54 upgrades and 157 downgrades with complete 
data necessary to estimate bankruptcy probabilities. Of these 211 rating changes, stock returns 
are available for 39 upgrades and 98 downgrades. Analysis of the sub-period sample yields the 
following untabulated results. For upgrades, the mean CAR is 0.54% (statistically insignificant), 
whereas the median CAR is 0.06% (statistically insignificant). For downgrades, the mean CAR is 
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-2.62% (p-value < 0. 01), whereas the median CAR is -1.26% (p-value < 0.01). None of the mean 
or median bankruptcy probability changes for the six months -3 through +3 are significant for 
upgrades. The pattern of probability changes around downgrades is similar to the one reported in 
table 3 for the full-period sample. Both the mean and median probability changes are positive in 
months -2 through +1. The means are statistically significant (p-values range from 0.05 to 0.002) 
in months -2 through +1. The magnitude of the probability changes is greater for the sub-period 
than for the full period. For example, the mean probability change in the month+1 is 0.0122 for 
the sub-period sample, compared with 0.0086 for the full-period sample.  
Sub-period regression results for equation (3) are also qualitatively similar to the full 
period results reported in table 5. The coefficient on B_Prob Change in Month+1 is somewhat 
larger in absolute value for the sub-period (downgrades: estimate -1.2682, t-statistic -2.17, p-
value < 0.03) than for the full period (downgrades: estimate -0.9623, t-statistic -4.80, p-value < 
0.01). Overall, the tenor of the results regarding the differential informativeness of upgrades and 
downgrades is the same for the 1998-2001 sub-period as that for the full period. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Several studies (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986) have found that the stock market 
response to bond upgrades and downgrades is asymmetric. Firms’ stock prices do not react to 
announcements of upgrades of their bond ratings, but affected firms’ stock returns are negative 
when rating agencies announce bond downgrades. This suggests either that bond upgrades are 
not as timely as bond downgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades 
but not downgrades. This study explores this issue by examining changes in firms’ probability of 
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bankruptcy (as estimated by the bankruptcy prediction model) and voluntary disclosure activity 
around bond rating changes. 
We find that firms’ estimated probability of bankruptcy decreases prior to, but not after, 
bond upgrades. Thus for upgrades, the rating agencies appear to be reacting to information 
available to the market prior to the rating action. By contrast, for bond downgrades, we find that 
firms’ estimated probability of bankruptcy significantly increases both before and after the rating 
changes. We also examine differences in the number of, and change in, press releases and 
earnings forecasts issued by the managers of upgraded and downgraded firms prior to the rating 
changes. These tests, while limited by their focus on disclosure quantity rather than content, 
suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by 
differences in pre-rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The 
analysis using the content of management earnings forecasts confirms this conclusion. 
The results suggest that downgrades are timelier than upgrades, and that the differential 
stock price response to upgrades and downgrades is attributable to the differences in the 
timeliness of the two types of ratings changes. Neither upgrades nor downgrades are entirely 
timely, however, since significant changes in bankruptcy risk are also evident prior to both kinds 
of rating revisions. These results should be of interest to the SEC, which recently review the role 
that bond rating agencies play in the capital markets. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
  
Combined 
Sample   Upgrades    Downgrades 
 Mean Median Std.Dev  Mean Median Std.Dev  Mean Median Std.Dev
            
Total Assets ($million) 5277.3 1326.6 17808.2  6220.2 1773.8 19639.8  4842.6 1026.2 16900.8
            
Market Value of Equity 
($million) 2595.1 5327.2 7329.1  3848.8 1443.9 8462.1  2028.2 3365.9 6687.3
            
Book Value of Equity 
($million) 1339.1 364.6 3863.9  1611.7 544.5 4685.7  1213.4 300.8 3417.5
            
Return on Assets -0.02 0.00 0.07  0.01 0.01 0.03  -0.03 0.00 0.08
            
Debt-to-Equity 0.73 0.69 0.23  0.69 0.67 0.20  0.75 0.70 0.24
            
 
The sample consists of 238 upgrades and 510 downgrades. The variables in Panel A are computed at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
rating change. Market value of equity is stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Return on assets is net income 
divided by total assets. Debt-to-Equity is total liabilities divided by total assets. 
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Panel B: Time distribution 
 
  Total  Upgrade  Downgrade   
Year   Freq percent  Freq percent  Freq percent   Downgrade percent 
1980  5 0.67  2 0.84 3 0.59  60.00 
1981  6 0.80  3 1.26 3 0.59  50.00 
1982  18 2.41  6 2.52 12 2.35  66.67 
1983  29 3.88  11 4.62 18 3.53  62.07 
1984  23 3.07  10 4.20 13 2.55  56.52 
1985  28 3.74  9 3.78 19 3.73  67.86 
1986  33 4.41  7 2.94 26 5.10  78.79 
1987  28 3.74  7 2.94 21 4.12  75.00 
1988  20 2.67  7 2.94 13 2.55  65.00 
1989  33 4.41  15 6.30 18 3.53  54.55 
1990  29 3.88  4 1.68 25 4.90  86.21 
1991  30 4.01  11 4.62 19 3.73  63.33 
1992  23 3.07  5 2.10 18 3.53  78.26 
1993  25 3.34  9 3.78 16 3.14  64.00 
1994  21 2.81  8 3.36 13 2.55  61.90 
1995  26 3.48  14 5.88 12 2.35  46.15 
1996  35 4.68  17 7.14 18 3.53  51.43 
1997  39 5.21  25 10.50 14 2.75  35.90 
1998  55 7.35  17 7.14 38 7.45  69.09 
1999  56 7.49  15 6.30 41 8.04  73.21 
2000  51 6.82  16 6.72 35 6.86  68.63 
2001  62 8.29  11 4.62 51 10.00  82.26 
2002  38 5.08  4 1.68 34 6.67  89.47 
2003  35 4.68  5 2.10 30 5.88  85.71 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution 
 
  Total  Upgrade  Downgrade   
Industry   Freq percent  Freq percent  Freq percent Downgrade percent 
Manufacturing and Mineral  197 26.34  70 29.41  127 24.90 64.45 
Transportation, communication, and Utilities 391 52.27  107 44.96  284 55.69 72.63 
Miscellaneous  160 21.39  61 25.63  99 19.41 61.88 
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TABLE 2 
Matrix of Old and New Ratings 
 
     NEW RATING   
  Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 Ca C
O Aaa  5 4  1  
L Aa1 2  3 2   
D Aa2 2 1  8 1 1 1  
 Aa3 1  1  8 6 1  
R A1    7  18 3 1  
A A2   1 1 12 25 9 4 1 1 2  1
T A3     1 18 28 7 1 1 1 
I Baa1      4 11 16 11 1 1  
N Baa2      1 4 15 19 2 1 1 2
G Baa3      1 1 5 17 14 6 1 1 1
 Ba1      1 1 5 12 5 5 1 1
 Ba2      2 1 3 8 22 12 8 1
 Ba3      1 2 1 5 9  14 8 6 2 1
 B1     1 1 2 1 2 16 15 13 5 5 1
 B2      2 1 3 4 6 27 10 12 2 2
 B3      2 1  4 13 7 27 7 7
 Caa1       2 2 4 5
 Caa2      1 2  9 4 3 32 8
 Caa3       2 3
 Ca       4 4
        
 
This table summarizes data on old and new bond ratings for a sample of 748 rating changes obtained from Moody’s Default Risk 
Service. The sample consists of 238 upgrades and 510 downgrades. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics on Post-Rating Change Bankruptcy Probability 
 
 
Panel A. Sample Distribution 
 
           Post-Rating Change B_Probs 
 
Revised Rating Grade   Mean    Median Standard Deviation 
 
Investment (Baa3 and better)  0.0002     0.0001           0.0005 
 
Speculative (Ba1 and worse)  0.0491     0.0009           0.1603 
 
Difference test p-value   0.001      0.001 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Correlations Between Revised Ratings and Post-Rating Change B_Probs 
 
 
Correlation Type Sample   Coefficient         P-value 
 
Pearson  Full       -0.313    0.001 
Pearson  Upgrades      -0.196     0.01 
Pearson  Downgrades      -0.327    0.001 
 
Spearman  Full       -0.650    0.001 
Spearman  Upgrades      -0.229    0.001 
Spearman  Downgrades      -0.747    0.001 
 
 
These panels present descriptive statistics on sample firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy 
(B_Probs, computed using the Chava and Jarrow model) at the month-end following their 
bond rating revisions. Panel A presents the distribution of B_Probs, and Panel B presents 
correlations between the revised ratings, measured from 1 for C to 21 for Aaa, and 
B_Probs. In Panel A, difference test p-values are based on two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test) of means (medians). 
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TABLE 4 
Changes in the Probability of Bankruptcy around Bond Rating Revisions 
 
Panel A: Changes in Probability of Bankruptcy  
 
  Upgrades  Downgrades 
Month relative 
to rating change  Mean 
t-test   
p-value Median 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value  Mean 
t-test    
p-value Median 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value 
Month-3  0.000091 0.5929 -0.000003 0.0306  0.001720 0.3769 0.000003 0.0024 
Month-2  0.000255 0.3177 -0.000001 0.2858  0.002675 0.2016 0.000004 0.0011 
Month-1  0.000605 0.4547 -0.000001 0.1139  0.009091 0.0001 0.000003 0.0003 
Month0  -0.001179 0.3182 0.000000 0.9740  0.011357 0.0048 0.000003 0.0005 
Month+1  0.000016 0.1523 0.000001 0.2628  0.008561 0.0017 0.000004 0.0221 
Month+2  -0.000006 0.6589 -0.000002 0.0868  0.001517 0.5576 -0.000002 0.8507 
Month+3  -0.000006 0.7801 -0.000001 0.2859  0.000380 0.8410 -0.000004 0.0207 
 
 
Panel B: Changes in Probability of Bankruptcy for Upgrades with Positive Returns and Downgrade with Negative Returns Only 
 
  Upgrades  Downgrades 
Month relative 
to rating change  Mean 
t-test   
p-value Median 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value  Mean 
t-test    
p-value Median 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value 
Month-3  -0.000101 0.5834 -0.000004 0.0064  0.003757 0.1497 0.000001 0.0222 
Month-2  -0.000119 0.2793 0.000000 0.5720  0.002541 0.3896 0.000006 0.0003 
Month-1  -0.000041 0.0144 -0.000001 0.1360  0.009864 0.0008 0.000003 0.0022 
Month0  0.000005 0.7789 0.000000 0.6563  0.017173 0.0025 0.000002 0.0040 
Month+1  0.000009 0.5926 0.000000 0.7343  0.011943 0.0015 0.000008 0.0001 
Month+2  -0.000004 0.8504 -0.000002 0.0645  0.004772 0.1531 -0.000003 0.5068 
Month+3  0.000030 0.4230 0.000000 0.8917  0.000962 0.7328 -0.000005 0.0802 
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TABLE 4 continued 
 
This table presents monthly changes in sample firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy surrounding the revisions of their bond ratings. 
Months are indexed relative to the month of the rating change. The probability of bankruptcy is computed using the Chava and Jarrow 
(2004) public firm model with industry effects. The monthly change in the probability of bankruptcy is computed as the current 
month-end probability minus the previous month-end probability. P-values indicate significance levels for two-tailed t-tests. 
 
Panel A reports bankruptcy probability changes for a sample of 748 rating changes with 238 upgrades and 510 downgrades. Panel B 
reports bankruptcy probabilities for a sub-sample for which the direction of the rating revision is the same as the direction of the stock 
price reaction to the revision. The sub-sample consists of 101 upgrades with positive returns and 354 downgrade with negative returns.  
 
Mean and Medians are in bold if the absolute values are greater than 0.005. P-values are in bold if they are smaller than 5%. 
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TABLE 5 
The Association between Stock Returns and Bankruptcy Probability Changes 
 
     Full Sample   Downgrades 
Variable    Coefficient   Coefficient 
     (t-statistic)   (t-statistic) 
 
Intercept    -0.0059    0.0039 
      (-1.52)    (0.35) 
 
Number of Grades    0.0072***    0.0122* 
      (3.51)     (2.19) 
 
B_Prob Change 
 
Month-3   -0.7123**   -0.6522* 
      (-2.87)    (-2.17) 
 
Month-2   -0.6047*   -0.5089 
      (-2.02)    (-1.39) 
 
Month-1   -0.1533   -0.1466 
      (-0.97)    (-0.77) 
 
Month0   -0.3052   -0.3503 
      (-1.72)    (-1.61) 
 
Month+1   -1.0307***   -0.9623*** 
      (-6.35)    (-4.80) 
 
Month+2   -0.5216**   -0.5645* 
      (-2.67)    (-2.37) 
 
Month+3    0.2433       0.2165 
      (1.28)     (0.95) 
________________ 
 
N        630       427 
Adjusted R2               19.79%   19.15% 
 
 
This table presents regression results for equation (3): 
 
CAR = a0 + a1Number of Grades + a2B_Prob Change in Month-3  
+ a3B_Prob Change in Month-2 + a4B_Prob Change in Month-1 
+ a5B_Prob Change in Month0 + a6B_Prob Change in Month+1 
+ a7B_Prob Change in Month+2 + a8B_Prob Change in Month+3 + e 
 
CAR equals the three-day (day –1 through day +1) cumulative market model prediction 
error, Number of Grades equals the number of grades that the rating is revised, where 
ratings are measured from 1 for C to 21 for Aaa, and B_Prob Change in Month(t) is 
computed as the Month(t)-end B_Prob minus the Month(t-1)-end B_Prob. 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 levels respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Comparison of Pre-Rating Change Voluntary Disclosures by Upgraded and Downgraded Firms 
 
 Sub-Sample Mean  Sub-Sample Median 
  Up- Down- T-test Up- Down- Wilcoxon 
  grades grades p-value grades grades p-value 
 
Panel A: Press Releases 
 
Disclosures   11.24   11.46 0.93  4.00  2.00 0.69 
(# observations)   (132)      (305) 
 
Change     1.47     1.18 0.87   0.00   0.00 0.98  
(# observations)    (132)     (305)  
 
%Change     0.30     0.38 0.58   0.08   0.00 0.79 
(# observations)    (76)        (172) 
 
 
Panel B: Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Disclosures   0.108   0.221 0.01              0.000 0.000 0.01 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
 
Change  -0.032   0.012 0.29 0.000 0.000 0.54 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
   
 %Change  -0.528  -0.316 0.22             -1.000       -0.500 0.22 
(# observations)   (18)      (57) 
 
 
This table presents a comparison of press releases and management earnings forecasts 
issued by upgraded and downgraded firms. The sample period is 1991 through 2003. The 
variables examined are the number, change, and percentage change in each type of 
disclosure in the three-month period just prior to the bond rating change. The table 
reports variable means, medians, and significance levels for tests of differences in 
means/medians for the upgrade and downgrade sub-samples. The number of press 
releases is identified through a search by company name on Business Wire and PR 
Newswire. Management earnings forecasts are identified through a search by company 
name of the following two keyword sets (Bamber and Cheon 1998) on Business Wire, 
PR Newswire, and Dow Jones News Service: (1) see(s), expect(s), forecast(s), project(s), 
estimate(s), higher, and lower; and, (2) earnings, income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), 
improvement, better, performance. Disclosures equals the number of disclosures in the 
three-month period just prior to the bond rating change, and PrecedingDisclosures is the 
number of disclosures in the preceding three-month period. Change equals Disclosures 
minus PrecedingDisclosures. %Change equals Change scaled by PrecedingDisclosures. 
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TABLE 7 
Comparison of Pre-Rating Change Management Earnings Forecasts by Upgraded and 
Downgraded Firms - Bad News and Good News 
 
 Sub-Sample Mean  Sub-Sample Median 
  Up- Down- T-test Up- Down- Wilcoxon 
  grades grades p-value grades grades p-value 
 
Panel A: Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Disclosures   0.006   0.065 0.01              0.000 0.000 0.01 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
 
Change  -0.006  -0.009 0.44 0.000 0.000 0.61 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
   
 %Change  -1.000  -0.694 0.37             -1.000       -1.000 0.39 
(# observations)   (2)      (18)  
 
 
Panel B: Good News Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
Disclosures   0.019   0.003 0.16              0.000 0.000 0.06 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
 
Change   0.000  -0.006 0.77 0.000 0.000 0.35 
(# observations)   (157)      (339) 
   
 %Change  -1.000  -1.000 N/A            -1.000       -1.000 1.00 
(# observations)   (2)      (3) 
 
 
This table presents a comparison of management earnings forecasts issued by upgraded 
and downgraded firms. The sample period is 1991 through 2003. The variables examined 
are the number, change, and percentage change in bad news or good news management 
earnings forecasts in the three-month period just prior to the bond rating change. The 
table reports variable means, medians, and significance levels for tests of differences in 
means/medians for the upgrade and downgrade sub-samples. Management earnings 
forecasts are identified through a search by company name of the following two keyword 
sets (Bamber and Cheon 1998) on Business Wire, PR Newswire, and Dow Jones News 
Service: (1) see(s), expect(s), forecast(s), project(s), estimate(s), higher, and lower; and, 
(2) earnings, income, results, loss, gain, profit(s), improvement, better, performance. 
Disclosures equals the number of disclosures in the three-month period just prior to the 
bond rating change, and PrecedingDisclosures is the number of disclosures in the 
preceding three-month period. Change equals Disclosures minus PrecedingDisclosures. 
%Change equals Change scaled by PrecedingDisclosures. Good News and Bad News 
forecasts are determined based on the comparison of management earnings forecasts and 
the existing analysts’ consensus forecasts obtained from IBES. 
